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Abstract 
Software capable of improving itself has been a dream of computer scientists since the inception 
of the field. In this work we provide definitions for Recursively Self-Improving software, survey 
different types of self-improving software, review the relevant literature, analyze limits on 
computation restricting recursive self-improvement and introduce RSI Convergence Theory 
which aims to predict general behavior of RSI systems. Finally, we address security implications 
from self-improving intelligent software.  
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1. Introduction 
Since the early days of computer science, visionaries in the field anticipated creation of a self-
improving intelligent system, frequently as an easier pathway to creation of true artificial 
intelligence. As early as 1950 Alan Turing wrote: “Instead of trying to produce a programme to 
simulate the adult mind, why not rather try to produce one which simulates the child’s? If this 
were then subjected to an appropriate course of education one would obtain the adult brain. 
Presumably the child-brain is something like a notebook as one buys from the stationers. Rather 
little mechanism, and lots of blank sheets... Our hope is that there is so little mechanism in the 
child-brain that something like it can be easily programmed. The amount of work in the 
education we can assume, as a first approximation, to be much the same as for the human child” 
[1].   
 
Turing’s approach to creation of artificial (super)intelligence was echoed by I.J. Good, Marvin 
Minsky and John von Neumann, all three of whom published on it (interestingly in the same 
year, 1966): Good - “Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass 
all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of 
these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there 
would then unquestionably be an ‘intelligence explosion,’ and the intelligence of man would be 
left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever 
make” [2]. Minsky - “Once we have devised programs with a genuine capacity for self-
improvement a rapid evolutionary process will begin. As the machine improves both itself and 
its model of itself, we shall begin to see all the phenomena associated with the terms 
“consciousness,” “intuition” and “intelligence” itself. It is hard to say how close we are to this 
threshold, but once it is crossed the world will not be the same” [3]. Von Neumann - “There is 
thus this completely decisive property of complexity, that there exists a critical size below which 
the process of synthesis is degenerative, but above which the phenomenon of synthesis, if 
properly arranged, can become explosive, in other words, where syntheses of automata can 
proceed in such a manner that each automaton will produce other automata which are more 
complex and of higher potentialities than itself” [4]. Similar types of arguments are still being 
made today by modern researchers and the area of RSI research continues to grow in popularity 
[5-7], though some [8] have argued that recursive self-improvement process requires 
hyperhuman capability to “get the ball rolling”, a kind of “Catch 22” . 
 
Intuitively most of us have some understanding of what it means for a software system to be self-
improving, however we believe it is important to precisely define such notions and to 
systematically investigate different types of self-improving software. First we need to define the 
notion of improvement. We can talk about improved efficiency – solving same problems faster 
or with less need for computational resources (such as memory). We can also measure 
improvement in error rates or finding closer approximations to optimal solutions, as long as our 
algorithm is functionally equivalent from generation to generation. Efficiency improvements can 
be classified as either producing a linear improvement as between different algorithms in the 
same complexity class (ex. NP), or as producing a fundamental improvement as between 
different complexity classes (ex. P vs NP) [9]. It is also very important to remember that 
complexity class notation (Big-O) may hide significant constant factors which while ignorable 
theoretically may change relative order of efficiency in practical applications of algorithms.  
 
This type of analysis works well for algorithms designed to accomplish a particular task, but 
doesn’t work well for general purpose intelligent software as an improvement in one area may go 
together with decreased performance in another domain. This makes it hard to claim that the 
updated version of the software is indeed an improvement. Mainly, the major improvement we 
want from self-improving intelligent software is higher degree of intelligence which can be 
approximated via machine friendly IQ tests [10] with a significant G-factor correlation. 
 
A particular type of self-improvement known as Recursive Self-Improvement (RSI) is 
fundamentally different as it requires that the system not only get better with time, but that it gets 
better at getting better. A truly RSI system is theorized not to be subject to diminishing returns, 
but would instead continue making significant improvements and such improvements would 
become more substantial with time. Consequently, an RSI system would be capable of open 
ended self-improvement. As a result, it is possible that unlike with standard self-improvement, in 
RSI systems from generation-to-generation most source code comprising the system will be 
replaced by different code. This brings up the question of what “self” refers to in this context. If 
it is not the source code comprising the agent then what is it? Perhaps we can redefine RSI as 
Recursive Source-code Improvement (RSI) to avoid dealing with this philosophical problem.  
Instead of trying to improve itself such a system is trying to create a different system which is 
better at achieving same goals as the original system. In the most general case it is trying to 
create an even smarter artificial intelligence.  
 
In this paper we will attempt to define the notion of self-improvement in software, survey 
possible types of self-improvement, analyze behavior of self-improving software, and discuss 
limits to such processes. 
 
2. Taxonomy of Types of Self-Improvement 
Self-improving software can be classified by the degree of self-modification it entails. In general 
we distinguish three levels of improvement – modification, improvement (weak self-
improvement) and recursive improvement (strong self-improvement). 
  
Self-Modification does not produce improvement and is typically employed for code obfuscation 
to protect software from being reverse engineered or to disguise self-replicating computer viruses 
from detection software. While a number of obfuscation techniques are known to exist [11], ex. 
self-modifying code [12], polymorphic code, metamorphic code, diversion code [13], none of 
them are intended to modify the underlying algorithm. The sole purpose of such approaches is to 
modify how the source code looks to those trying to understand the software in questions and 
what it does [14].   
 
Self-Improvement  or Self-adaptation [15] is a desirable property of many types of software 
products [16] and typically allows for some optimization or customization of the product to the 
environment and users it is deployed with. Common examples of such software include 
evolutionary algorithms such as Genetic Algorithms [17-22] or Genetic Programming which 
optimize software parameters with respect to some well understood fitness function and perhaps 
work over some highly modular programming language to assure that all modifications result in 
software which can be compiled and evaluated. The system may try to optimize its components 
by creating internal tournaments between candidate solutions. Omohundro proposed the concept 
of efficiency drives in self-improving software [23]. Because of one of such drives, balance 
drive, self-improving systems will tend to balance the allocation of resources between their 
different subsystems. If the system is not balanced overall performance of the system could be 
increased by shifting resources from subsystems with small marginal improvement to those with 
larger marginal increase [23]. While performance of the software as a result of such optimization 
may be improved the overall algorithm is unlikely to be modified to a fundamentally more 
capable one.  
 
Additionally, the law of diminishing returns quickly sets in and after an initial significant 
improvement phase, characterized by discovery of “low-hanging fruit”, future improvements are 
likely to be less frequent and less significant, producing a Bell curve of valuable changes. 
Metareasoning, metalearning, learning to learn, and lifelong learning are terms which are often 
used in the machine learning literature to indicate self-modifying learning algorithms or the 
process of selecting an algorithm which will perform best in a particular problem domain [24]. 
Yudkowsky calls such process non-recursive optimization – a situation in which one component 
of the system does the optimization and another component is getting optimized [25].  
 
In the field of complex dynamic systems, aka chaos theory, positive feedback systems are well 
known to always end up in what is known as an attractor- a region within system’s state space 
that the system can’t escape from [26]. A good example of such attractor convergence is the 
process of Metacompilation or Supercompilation [27] in which a program designed to take 
source code written by a human programmer and to optimize it for speed is applied to its own 
source code. It will likely produce a more efficient compiler on the first application perhaps by  
20%, on the second application by 3%, and after a few more recursive iterations converge to a 
fixed point of zero improvement [26].  
 
Recursive Self-Improvement is the only type of improvement which has potential to completely 
replace the original algorithm with a completely different approach and more importantly to do 
so multiple times. At each stage newly created software should be better at optimizing future 
version of the software compared to the original algorithm. As of the time of this writing it is a 
purely theoretical concept with no working RSI software known to exist. However, as many have 
predicted that such software might become a reality in the 21
st
 century it is important to provide 
some analysis of properties such software would exhibit.   
 
Self-modifying and self-improving software systems are already well understood and are quite 
common. Consequently, we will concentrate exclusively on RSI systems. In practice 
performance of almost any system can be trivially improved by allocation of additional 
computational resources such as more memory, higher sensor resolution, faster processor or 
greater network bandwidth for access to information. This linear scaling doesn’t fit the definition 
of recursive-improvement as the system doesn’t become better at improving itself. To fit the 
definition the system would have to engineer a faster type of memory not just purchase more 
memory units of the type it already has access to. In general hardware improvements are likely to 
speed up the system, while software improvements (novel algorithms) are necessary for 
achievement of meta-improvements.     
 
It is believed that AI systems will have a number of advantages over human programmers 
making it possible for them to succeed where we have so far failed. Such advantages include 
[28]: longer work spans (no breaks, sleep, vocation, etc.), omniscience (expert level knowledge 
in all fields of science, absorbed knowledge of all published works), superior computational 
resources (brain vs processor, human memory vs RAM), communication speed (neurons vs 
wires), increased serial depth (ability to perform sequential operations in access of about a 100 
human brain can manage), duplicability (intelligent software can be instantaneously copied), 
editability (source code unlike DNA can be quickly modified), goal coordination (AI copies can 
work towards a common goal without much overhead), improved rationality (AIs are likely to be 
free from human cognitive biases) [29], new sensory modalities (native sensory hardware for 
source code), blending over of deliberative and automatic processes (management of 
computational resources over multiple tasks), introspective perception and manipulation (ability 
to analyze low level hardware, ex. individual neurons), addition of hardware (ability to add new 
memory, sensors, etc.), advanced communication (ability to share underlying cognitive 
representations for memories and skills) [30]. 
 
Chalmers [31] uses logic and mathematical induction to show that if an AI0 system is capable of 
producing only slightly more capable AI1 system generalization of that process leads to 
superintelligent performance in AIn after n generations. He articulates, that his proof assumes 
that the proportionality thesis, which states that increases in intelligence lead to proportionate 
increases in the capacity to design future generations of AIs, is true.  
 
Nivel et al. proposed formalization of RSI systems as autocatalytic sets – collections of entities 
comprised of elements, each of which can be created by other elements in the set making it 
possible for the set to self-maintain and update itself. They also list properties of a system which 
make it purposeful, goal-oriented and self-organizing, particularly: reflectivity – ability to 
analyze and rewrite its own structure; autonomy – being free from influence by system’s original 
designers (bounded autonomy – is a property of a system with elements which are not subject to 
self-modification);  endogeny – an autocatalytic ability [32]. Nivel and Thorisson also attempt to 
operationalize autonomy by the concept of self-programming which they insist has to be done in 
an experimental way instead of a theoretical way (via proofs of correctness) since it is the only 
tractable approach [33]. 
 
Yudkowsky writes prolifically about recursive self-improving processes and suggests that 
introduction of certain concepts might be beneficial to the discussion, specifically he proposes 
use of terms - Cascades, Cycles and Insight which he defines as: Cascades – when one 
development leads to another; Cycles – repeatable cascade in which one optimization leads to 
another which in turn benefits the original optimization; Insight – new information which greatly 
increases one’s optimization ability [34]. Yudkowsky also suggests that the goodness and 
number of opportunities in the space of solutions be known as Optimization Slope while 
optimization resources and optimization efficiency refer to how much of computational resources 
an agent has access to and how efficiently the agent utilizes said resources. An agent engaging in 
an optimization process and able to hit non-trivial targets in large search space [35] is described 
as having significant optimization power [25].   
  
RSI software could be classified based on the number of improvements it is capable of 
achieving. The most trivial case is the system capable of undergoing a single fundamental 
improvement. The hope is that truly RSI software will be capable of many such improvements, 
but the question remains open regarding the possibility of an infinite number of recursive-
improvements. It is possible that some upper bound on improvements exists limiting any RSI 
software to a finite number of desirable and significant rewrites. Critics explain failure of 
scientists, to date, to achieve a sustained RSI process by saying that RSI researchers have fallen 
victims of the bootstrap fallacy [36]. 
 
Another axis on which RSI systems can be classified has to do with how improvements are 
discovered. Two fundamentally different approaches are understood to exist. The first one is a 
brute force based approach [37] which utilizes Levin (Universal [38]) Search [39]. The idea is to 
consider all possible strings of source code up to some size limit and to select the one which can 
be proven to provide improvements. While theoretically optimal and guaranteed to find superior 
solution if one exists this method is not computationally feasible in practice. Some variants of 
this approach to self-improvement, known as Gödel Machines [40-45], Optimal Ordered 
Problem Solver (OOPS) [46] and Incremental Self-Improvers [47, 48], have been thoroughly 
analyzed by Schmidhuber and his co-authors. Second approach assumes that the system has a 
certain level of scientific competence and uses it to engineer and test its own replacement. 
Whether a system of any capability can intentionally invent a more capable and so a more 
complex system remains as the fundamental open problem of RSI research.  
 
Finally, we can consider a hybrid RSI system which includes both an artificially intelligent 
program and a human scientist. Mixed human-AI teams have been very successful in many 
domains such as chess or theorem proving. It would be surprising if having a combination of 
natural and artificial intelligence did not provide an advantage in designing new AI systems or 
enhancing biological intelligence. We are currently experiencing a limited version of this 
approach with human computer scientists developing progressively better versions of AI 
software (while utilizing continuously improving software tools), but since the scientists 
themselves remain unenhanced we can’t really talk about self-improvement. This type of RSI 
can be classified as Indirect recursive improvement as opposed to Direct RSI in which the 
system itself is responsible for all modifications. Other types of Indirect RSI may be based on 
collaboration between multiple artificial systems instead of AI and human teams [49].  
 
In addition to classification with respect to types of RSI we can also evaluate systems as to 
certain binary properties. For example: We may be interested only in systems which are 
guaranteed not to decrease in intelligence, even temporarily, during the improvement process. 
This may not be possible if the intelligence design landscape contains local maxima points.  
 
Another property of any RSI system we are interested in understanding better is necessity of 
unchanging source code segments. In other words must an RSI system be able to modify any part 
of its source code or are certain portions of the system (encoded goals, verification module) must 
remain unchanged from generation to generation. Such portions would be akin to ultra-conserved 
elements or conserved sequences of DNA [50, 51] found among multiple related species. This 
question is particularly important for the goal preservation in self-improving intelligent software, 
as we want to make sure that future generations of the system are motivated to work on the same 
problem [31]. As AI goes through the RSI process and becomes smarter and more rational it is 
likely to engage in a de-biasing process removing any constraints we programmed into it [8]. 
Ideally we would want to be able to prove that even after recursive self-improvement our 
algorithm maintains the same goals as the original. Proofs of safety or correctness for the 
algorithm only apply to particular source code and would need to be rewritten and re-proven if 
the code is modified, which happens in RSI software many times. But we suspect that re-proving 
slightly modified code may be easier compared to having to prove safety of a completely novel 
piece of code. 
 
We are also interested in understanding if RSI process can take place in an isolated  (leakproofed 
[52]) system or if interaction with external environment, internet, people, other AI agents is 
necessary. Perhaps access to external information can be used to mediate speed of RSI process. 
This also has significant implications on safety mechanisms we can employ while experimenting 
with early RSI systems [53-61]. Finally, it needs to be investigated if the whole RSI process can 
be paused at any point and for any specific duration of time in order to limit any negative impact 
from potential intelligence explosion. Ideally we would like to be able to program our Seed AI to 
RSI until it reaches certain level of intelligence, pause and wait for further instructions.  
 
On the Limits of Recursively Self-Improving Artificially Intelligent Systems 
The mere possibility of recursively self-improving software remains unproven. In this section we 
present a number of arguments against such phenomenon.  
 
First of all, any implemented software system relies on hardware for memory, communication 
and information processing needs even if we assume that it will take a non-Von Neumann  
(quantum) architecture to run such software. This creates strict theoretical limits to computation, 
which despite hardware advances predicted by Moore’s law will not be overcome by any future 
hardware paradigm. Bremermann [62], Bekenstein [63], Lloyd [64], Anders [65], Aaronson [66], 
Shannon [67], Krauss [68], and many others have investigated ultimate limits to computation in 
terms of speed, communication and energy consumption with respect to such factors as speed of 
light, quantum noise, and gravitational constant. Some research has also been done on 
establishing ultimate limits for enhancing human brain’s intelligence [69].  While their specific 
numerical findings are outside of the scope of this work, one thing is indisputable: there are 
ultimate physical limits to computation. Since more complex systems have greater number of 
components and require more matter, even if individual parts are designed at nanoscale, we can 
conclude that just like matter and energy are directly related [70] and matter and information (“it 
from bit”) [71] so is matter and intelligence. While we are obviously far away from hitting any 
limits imposed by availability of matter in the universe for construction of our supercomputers it 
is a definite theoretical upper limit on achievable intelligence even under the multiverse 
hypothesis.  
 
In addition to limitations endemic to hardware, software-related limitations may present even 
bigger obstacles for RSI systems. Intelligence is not measured as a standalone value but with 
respect to the problems it allows to solve. For many problems such as playing checkers [72] it is 
possible to completely solve the problem (provide an optimal solution after considering all 
possible options) after which no additional performance improvement would be possible [73]. 
Other problems are known to be unsolvable regardless of level of intelligence applied to them 
[74]. Assuming separation of complexity classes (such as P vs NP) holds [9], it becomes obvious 
that certain classes of problems will always remain only approximately solvable and any 
improvements in solutions will come from additional hardware resources not higher intelligence.  
 
Wiedermann argues that cognitive systems form an infinite hierarchy and from a computational 
point of view human-level intelligence is upper-bounded by the ∑2 class of the Arithmetic 
Hierarchy [75]. Because many real world problems are computationally infeasible for any non-
trivial inputs even an AI which achieves human level performance is unlikely to progress 
towards higher levels of the cognitive hierarchy. So while theoretically machines with super-
Turing computational power are possible, in practice they are not implementable as the non-
computable information needed for their function is just that – not computable. Consequently 
Wiedermann states that while machines of the future will be able to solve problems, solvable by 
humans, much faster and more reliably they will still be limited by computational limits found in 
upper levels of the Arithmetic Hierarchy [75, 76]. 
 
Mahoney attempts to formalize what it means for a program to have a goal G and to self-improve 
with respect to being able to reach said goal under constraint of time, t [77]. Mahoney defines a 
goal as a function G: N  R mapping natural numbers N to real numbers R. Given a universal 
Turing machine L, Mahoney defines P(t) to mean the positive natural number encoded by output 
of the program P with input t running on L after t time steps, or 0 if P has not halted after t steps. 
Mahoney’s representation says that P has goal G at time t if and only if there exists t’ > t such 
that G(P(t’)) > G(P(t)) and for all t’ > t, G(P(t’) ≥ G(P(t)). If P has a goal G, then G(P(t)) is a 
monotonically increasing function of t with no maximum for t > C. Q improves on P with 
respect to goal G if and only if all of the following condition are true: P and Q have goal Q. t, 
G(Q(t)) > G(P(t)) and ~t, t’ > t, G(Q(t)) > G(P(t)) [77]. Mahoney then defines an improving 
sequence with respect to G as an infinite sequence of program P1, P2, P3, … such that for i, i > 
0, Pi+1 improves Pi with respect to G. Without the loss of generality Mahoney extends the 
definition to include the value -1 to be an acceptable input, so P(-1) outputs appropriately 
encoded software. He finally defines P1 as an RSI program with respect to G iff Pi(-1) = Pi+1 for 
all i > 0 and the sequence Pi, i = 1, 2, 3 … is an improving sequence with respect to goal G [77].  
Mahoney also analyzes complexity of RSI software and presents a proof demonstrating that the 
algorithmic complexity of Pn (the nth iteration of an RSI program) is not greater than O(log n) 
implying a very limited amount of knowledge gain would be possible in practice despite 
theoretical possibility of RSI systems [77]. Yudkowsky also considers possibility of receiving 
only logarithmic returns on cognitive reinvestment: log(n) + log(log(n)) +  … in each recursive 
cycle [25].   
 
Other limitations may be unique to the proposed self-improvement approach. For example Levin 
type search through the program space will face problems related to Rice’s theorem [78] which 
states that for any arbitrarily chosen program it is impossible to test if it has any non-trivial 
property such as being very intelligent. This testing is of course necessary to evaluate redesigned 
code. Also, universal search over the space of mind designs which will not be computationally 
possible due to the No Free Lunch theorems [79] as we have no information to reduce the size of 
the search space [80]. Other difficulties related to testing remain even if we are not taking about 
arbitrarily chosen programs but about those we have designed with a specific goal in mind and 
which consequently avoid problems with Rice’s theorem. One such difficulty is determining if 
something is an improvement. We can call this obstacle – “multidimensionality of optimization”. 
No change is strictly an improvement; it is always a tradeoff between gain in some areas and loss 
in others. For example, how do we evaluate and compare two software systems one of which is 
better at chess and the other at poker? Assuming the goal is increased intelligence over the 
distribution of all potential environments the system would have to figure out how to test 
intelligence at levels above its own a problem which remains unsolved. In general the science of 
testing for intelligence above level achievable by naturally occurring humans (IQ < 200) is in its 
infancy. De Garis raises a problem of evaluating quality of changes made to the top level 
structures responsible for determining the RSI’s functioning, structures which are not judged by 
any higher level modules and so present a fundamental difficulty in accessing their performance 
[81].  
 
Other obstacles to RSI have also been suggested in the literature. Löb’s theorem states that a 
mathematical system can’t assert its own soundness without becoming inconsistent [82], 
meaning a sufficiently expressive formal system can’t know that everything it proves to be true 
is actually so [82]. Such ability is necessary to verify that modified versions of the program are 
still consistent with its original goal of getting smarter. Another obstacle, called procrastination 
paradox will also prevent the system from making modifications to its code since the system will 
find itself in a state in which a change made immediately is as desirable and likely as the same 
change made later [83, 84]. Since postponing making the change carries no negative implications 
and may actually be safe this may result in an infinite delay of actual implementation of provably 
desirable changes.  
 Similarly, Bolander raises some problems inherent in logical reasoning with self-reference, 
namely, self-contradictory reasoning, exemplified by the Knower Paradox of the form - “This 
sentence is false” [85]. Orseau and Ring introduce what they call “Simpleton Gambit” a situation 
in which an agent will chose to modify itself towards its own detriment if presented with a high 
enough reward to do so [86]. Yampolskiy reviews a number of related problems in rational self-
improving optimizers, above a certain capacity, and concludes, that despite opinion of many, 
such machines will choose to “wirehead” [87]. Chalmers [31] suggests a number of previously 
unanalyzed potential obstacles on the path to RSI software with Correlation obstacle being one 
of them. He describes it as a possibility that no interesting properties we would like to amplify 
will correspond to ability to design better software.  
 
Yampolskiy is also concerned with accumulation of errors in software undergoing an RSI 
process, which is conceptually similar to accumulation of mutations in the evolutionary process 
experienced by biological agents. Errors (bugs) which are not detrimental to system’s 
performance are very hard to detect and may accumulate from generation to generation building 
on each other until a critical mass of such errors leads to erroneous functioning of the system, 
mistakes in evaluating quality of the future generations of the software or a complete breakdown 
[88]. 
 
The self-reference aspect in self-improvement system itself also presents some serious 
challenges. It may be the case that the minimum complexity necessary to become RSI is higher 
than what the system itself is able to understand. We see such situations frequently at lower 
levels of intelligence, for example a squirrel doesn’t have mental capacity to understand how a 
squirrel’s brain operates. Paradoxically, as the system becomes more complex it may take 
exponentially more intelligence to understand itself and so a system which starts capable of 
complete self-analysis may lose that ability as it self-improves. Informally we can call it the 
Munchausen obstacle, inability of a system to lift itself by its own bootstraps. An additional 
problem may be that the system in question is computationally irreducible [89] and so can’t 
simulate running its own source code. An agent cannot predict what it will think without thinking 
it first. A system needs 100% of its memory to model itself, which leaves no memory to record 
the output of the simulation. Any external memory to which the system may write becomes part 
of the system and so also has to be modeled. Essentially the system will face an infinite regress 
of self-models from which it can’t escape. Alternatively, if we take a physics perspective on the 
issue, we can see intelligence as a computational resource (along with time and space) and so 
producing more of it will not be possible for the same reason why we can’t make a perpetual 
motion device as it would violate fundamental laws of nature related to preservation of energy. 
Similarly it has been argued that a Turing Machine cannot output a machine of greater 
algorithmic complexity [90]. 
 
We can even attempt to formally prove impossibility of intentional RSI process via proof by 
contradiction: Let’s define RSI R1 as a program not capable of algorithmically solving a problem 
of difficulty X, say Xi. If R1 modifies its source code after which it is capable of solving Xi it 
violates our original assumption that R1 is not capable of solving Xi since any introduced 
modification could be a part of the solution process, so we have a contradiction of our original 
assumption, and R1 can’t produce any modification which would allow it to solve Xi, which was 
to be shown. Informally, if an agent can produce a more intelligent agent it would already be as 
capable as that new agent. Even some of our intuitive assumptions about RSI are incorrect. It 
seems that it should be easier to solve a problem if we already have a solution to a smaller 
instance of such problem [91] but in a formalized world of problems belonging to the same 
complexity class, re-optimization problem is proven to be as difficult as optimization itself [92-
95].  
 
Analysis 
A number of fundamental problems remain open in the area of RSI. We still don’t know the 
minimum intelligence necessary for commencing the RSI process, but we can speculate that it 
would be on par with human intelligence which we associate with universal or general 
intelligence [96], though in principal a sub-human level system capable of self-improvement 
can’t be excluded [31]. One may argue that even human level capability is not enough because 
we already have programmers (people or their intellectual equivalence formalized as functions 
[97] or Human Oracles [98, 99]) who have access to their own source code (DNA), but who fail 
to understand how DNA (nature) works to create their intelligence. This doesn’t even include 
additional complexity in trying to improve on existing DNA code or complicating factors 
presented by the impact of learning environment (nurture) on development of human 
intelligence. Worse yet, it is not obvious how much above human ability an AI needs to be to 
begin overcoming the “complexity barrier” associated with self-understanding. Today’s AIs can 
do many things people are incapable of doing, but are not yet capable of RSI behavior.  
 
We also don’t know the minimum size of program (called Seed AI [100]) necessary to get the 
ball rolling. Perhaps if it turns out that such “minimal genome” is very small a brute force [37] 
approach might succeed in discovering it. We can assume that our Seed AI is the smartest 
Artificial General Intelligence known to exist [101] in the world as otherwise we can simply 
delegate the other AI as the seed. It is also not obvious how the source code size of RSI will 
change as it goes through the improvement process, in other words what is the relationship 
between intelligence and minimum source code size necessary to support it. In order to answer 
such questions it may be useful to further formalize the notion of RSI perhaps by representing 
such software as a Turing Machine [102] with particular inputs and outputs. If that could be 
successfully accomplished a new area of computational complexity analysis may become 
possible in which we study algorithms with dynamically changing complexity (Big-O) and 
address questions about how many code modification are necessary to achieve certain level of 
performance from the algorithm.  
 
This of course raises the question of speed of RSI process, are we expecting it to take seconds, 
minutes, days, weeks, years or more (hard takeoff VS soft takeoff) for the RSI system to begin 
hitting limits of what is possible with respect to physical limits of computation [103]? Even in 
suitably constructed hardware (human baby) it takes decades of data input (education) to get to 
human-level performance (adult). It is also not obvious if the rate of change in intelligence would 
be higher for a more advanced RSI, because it is more capable, or for a “newbie” RSI because it 
has more low hanging fruit to collect. We would have to figure out if we are looking at 
improvement in absolute terms or as a percentage of system’s current intelligence score.  
 
Yudkowsky attempts to analyze most promising returns on cognitive reinvestment as he 
considers increasing size, speed or ability of RSI systems. He also looks at different possible 
rates of return and arrives at three progressively steeper trajectories for RSI improvement which 
he terms: “fizzle”, “combust” and “explode” aka “AI go FOOM” [25]. Hall [8] similarly 
analyzes rates of return on cognitive investment and derives a curve equivalent to double the 
Moore’s Law rate. Hall also suggest that an AI would be better of trading money it earns 
performing useful work for improved hardware or software rather than attempt to directly 
improve itself since it would not be competitive against more powerful optimization agents such 
as Intel corporation.   
 
Fascinatingly, by analyzing properties which correlate with intelligence, Chalmers [31] is able to 
generalize self-improvement optimization to properties other than intelligence. We can agree that 
RSI software as we describe it in this work is getting better at designing software not just at 
being generally intelligent. Similarly other properties associated with design capacity can be 
increased along with capacity to design software for example capacity to design systems with 
sense of humor and so in addition to intelligence explosion we may face an explosion of 
funniness. 
 
RSI Convergence Theorem 
A simple thought experiment regarding RSI can allow us to arrive at a fascinating hypothesis. 
Regardless of the specifics behind the design of the Seed AI used to start an RSI process all such 
systems, attempting to achieve superintelligence, will converge to the same software 
architecture. We will call this intuition - RSI Convergence Theory. There is a number of ways in 
which it can happen, depending on the assumptions we make, but in all cases the outcome is the 
same, a practically computable agent similar to AIXI (which is an incomputable but 
superintelligent agent [104]).  
 
If an upper limit to intelligence exists multiple systems will eventually reach that level, probably 
by taking different trajectories, and in order to increase their speed will attempt to minimize the 
size of their source code eventually discovering smallest program with such level of ability. It 
may even be the case that sufficiently smart RSIs will be able to immediately deduce such 
architecture from basic knowledge of physics and Kolmogorov Complexity [105]. If, however, 
intelligence turns out to be an unbounded property RSIs may not converge. They will also not 
converge if many programs with maximum intellectual ability exist and all have the same 
Kolmogorov complexity or if they are not general intelligences and are optimized for different 
environments. It is also likely that in the space of minds [35] stable attractors include sub-human 
and super-human intelligences with precisely human level of intelligence being a rare particular 
[30].  
 
If correct, predictions of RSI convergence imply creation of what Bostrom calls a Singleton 
[106], a single decision making agent in control of everything. Further speculation can lead us to 
conclude that converged RSI systems separated by space and time even at cosmological scales 
can engage in acausal cooperation [107, 108] since they will realize that they are the same agent 
with the same architecture and so are capable of running perfect simulations of each other’s 
future behavior. Such realization may allow converged superintelligence with completely 
different origins to implicitly cooperate particularly on meta-tasks. One may also argue that 
humanity itself is on the path which converges to the same point in the space of all possible 
intelligences (but is undergoing a much slower RSI process). Consequently, by observing a 
converged RSI architecture and properties humanity can determine its ultimate destiny, its 
purpose in life, its Coherent Extrapolated Volition (CEV) [109].    
 
Conclusions 
Recursively Self-Improving software is the ultimate form of artificial life and creation of life 
remains one of the great unsolved mysteries in science. More precisely, the problem of creating 
RSI software is really the challenge of creating a program capable of writing other programs 
[110], and so is an AI-Complete problem as has been demonstrated by Yampolskiy [98, 99]. AI-
complete problems are by definition most difficult problems faced by AI researchers and it is 
likely that RSI source code will be so complex that it would be difficult or impossible to fully 
analyze [49]. Also, the problem is likely to be NP-Complete as even simple metareasoning and 
metalearning [111] problems have been shown by Conitzer and Sandholm to belong to that class. 
In particular they proved that allocation of deliberation time across anytime algorithms running 
on different problem instances is NP-Complete and a complimentary problem of dynamically 
allocating information gathering resources by an agent across multiple actions is NP-Hard, even 
if evaluating each particular action is computationally simple. Finally, they showed that the 
problem of deliberately choosing a limited number of deliberation or information gathering 
actions to disambiguate the state of the world is PSPACE Hard in general [112].  
 
Intelligence is a computational resource and as with other physical resources (mass, speed) its 
behavior is probably not going to be just a typical linear extrapolation of what we are used to, if 
observed at high extremes (IQ > 200+). It may also be subject to fundamental limits such as the 
speed limit on travel of light or fundamental limits we do not yet understand or know about 
(unknown unknowns). In this work we reviewed a number of computational upper limits to 
which any successful RSI system will asymptotically strive to grow, we can note that despite 
existence of such upper bounds we are currently probably very far from reaching them and so 
still have plenty of room for improvement at the top. Consequently, any RSI achieving such 
significant level of enhancement, despite not creating an infinite process, will still seem like it is 
producing superintelligence with respect to our current state [113].  
  
The debate regarding possibility of RSI will continue. Some will argue that while it is possible to 
increase processor speed, amount of available memory or sensor resolution the fundamental 
ability to solve problems can’t be intentionally and continuously improved by the system itself. 
Additionally, critics may suggest that intelligence is upper bounded and only differs by speed 
and available info to process [114]. In fact they can point out to such maximum intelligence, be it 
a theoretical one, known as AIXI, an agent which given infinite computational resources will 
make purely rational decisions in any situation.  
 
A resource-dependent system undergoing RSI intelligence explosion can expand and harvest 
matter, at the speed of light, from its origin converting the universe around it into a 
computronium sphere [114]. It is also very likely to try and condense all the matter it obtains into 
a super-dense unit of constant volume (reminiscent of the original physical singularity point 
which produced the Big Bang, see Omega Point [115]) to reduce internal computational costs 
which grow with the overall size of the system and at cosmic scales are very significant even at 
the speed of light. A side effect of this process would be emergence of an event horizon 
impenetrable to scientific theories about the future states of the underlying RSI system. In some 
limited way we already see this condensation process in attempts of computer chip 
manufacturers to pack more and more transistors into exponentially more powerful chips of same 
or smaller size. And so, from the Big Bang explosion of the original cosmological Singularity to 
the Technological Singularity in which intelligence explodes and attempts to amass all the matter 
in the universe back into a point of infinite density (Big Crunch) which in turn causes the next 
(perhaps well controlled) Big Bang, the history of the universe continues and relies on 
intelligence as its driver and shaper (similar ideas are becoming popular in cosmology [116-
118]).  
 
Others will say that since intelligence is the ability to find patterns in data, intelligence has no 
upper bounds as the number of variables comprising a pattern can always be greater and so 
present a more complex problem against which intelligence can be measured. It is easy to see 
that even if in our daily life the problems we encounter do have some maximum difficulty it is 
certainly not the case with theoretical examples we can derive from pure mathematics. It seems 
likely that the debate will not be settled until a fundamental unsurmountable obstacle to RSI 
process is found or a proof by existence is demonstrated. Of course the question of permitting 
machines to undergo RSI transformation, if it is possible, is a separate and equally challenging 
problem.  
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